Emotion work and psychological well-being
A review of the literature
and some conceptual considerations

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Abstract

In this article, the state of the art of research on emotion work (emotional labor) is summarized with an emphasis on its effects on well-being. It starts with a definition of what emotional labor or emotion work is. Aspects of emotion work, such as automatic emotion regulation, surface acting, and deep acting, are discussed from an action theory point of view. Empirical studies so far show that emotion work has both positive and negative effects on health. Negative effects were found for emotional dissonance. Concepts related to the frequency of emotion expression and the requirement to be sensitive to the emotions of others had both positive and negative effects. Control and social support moderate relations between emotion work variables and burnout and job satisfaction. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the cooccurrence of emotion work and organizational problems leads to high levels of burnout. © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Inc.

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1. Introduction

Emotions in organizations have found increasing interest among scientists and practitioners in recent years (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Briner, 1999; Fineman, 1993). One of the topics is emotional labor or emotion work, in which the expression of organizationally desired emotions is part of one’s job. Emotion work occurs when one has to work with people...
as it is done in the service sector which has now reached 59% of the European workforce (Paoli, 1997). The article starts with a definition of emotional labor or emotion work and related concepts. I will then summarize research on emotion work and describe the effects of emotion work on burnout and job satisfaction.

2. Emotion work

The concept of emotional labor was introduced by Hochschild (1979, 1983). In her seminal book published in 1983, she investigated flight attendants and demonstrated convincingly that their work could not be fully described by the physical aspects of their work (e.g., the confined space in airplanes), sensorimotor demands (e.g., serving coffee without spilling), and cognitive demands (e.g., acting quickly and safely in emergency situations). Rather, a substantial part of the job was dealing with the passengers and their emotions. Whereas physical and cognitive aspects of work have been in the center of work psychology since the beginning of this century (e.g., Ulrich, 1998), it is only recently that researchers started to investigate emotional work demands.

The concept of emotion work refers to the quality of interactions between employees and clients. ‘Client’ is used here to refer to any person who interacts with an employee, for example, patients, children, customers, passengers, or guests. During face-to-face or voice-to-voice interactions, many employees are required to express appropriate emotions as a job requirement. Examples are the above-mentioned flight attendants who are required to be friendly even to arrogant or aggressive customers, nurses or teachers who have to show empathy towards patients or children, and bank employees who have to signal trustworthiness by putting on a friendly but solemn face. Hochschild (1983) drew upon the work of Goffman (1959) to argue that in practically all social interactions, people tend to play roles and try to create certain impressions. Impressions include the display of normatively appropriate emotions following certain display rules. Of course, this idea also applies to social interactions in organizations. Employees are not only required to work on tasks and spend mental and physical effort. They are also required to manage their emotions as a part of their job. It is important to note that this is different from considering emotions as a reaction to the various conditions of the organizational environment as investigated in the emotions at work literature (e.g., Briner, 1999; Pekrun & Frese, 1992). Rather, the focus is on emotions as a requirement of the job. The typical flight attendants would certainly often smile when talking to passengers. However, they would certainly also sometimes not smile, e.g., when dealing with arrogant passengers, when they feel exhausted, or when they are in a bad mood after a conflict with a colleague. Emotion work as a part of the job, however, implies that the desired emotions are required even in such situations. In this respect, Morris and Feldman (1996, p. 987) defined emotional labor as the “effort, planning, and control needed to express organizationally desired emotions during interpersonal transactions.”

Hochschild (1983, p. 7), as a sociologist, differentiated between emotional labor as the exchange value of work which is sold for a wage and emotion work or emotion management, which refers to the private context where they have use value. In psychological studies,
psychological processes, such as the regulation of work actions, rather than societal and economic aspects of labor are considered. In psychology, the term labor is used when sociological or societal concepts are involved, e.g., in the division of labor, labor–management relations, conflict resolution, and collective bargaining. The term is not used for individual behavior and intrapsychic concepts, e.g., physical and mental work demands, work motivation, work involvement, work design, etc. As Hochschild mentions, the acts are the same and so are most of the intrapsychic processes for emotion work inside and outside of the job although in some respects this differentiation plays a role in the appraisal of what one is doing. To be compatible with other fields of work and organizational psychology, the term emotion work is preferred.

Authors differ somewhat in their conceptualization of emotion work. Whereas Hochschild (1983, p. 7) was interested in “the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display,” other authors focussed on the expressive behavior because this is what they perceived to be organizationally desired and relevant (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Morris & Feldman, 1996). Ashforth and Humphrey (1993, p. 90) defined emotional labor as “the act of displaying appropriate emotion (i.e., conforming with a display rule).” It may be helpful to draw parallels to other concepts of work behavior. Hacker (1973), in his seminal book, argued that work psychology has to deal with the psychological processes of work which refer to work actions. These psychological processes refer to goal development, planning, monitoring, and feedback information processing which control the work actions. Accordingly, emotion work should be defined as the psychological processes necessary to regulate organizationally desired emotions. The ‘acts’ of emotion display (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993) are necessarily regulated by intrapsychological processes. Since most authors agree that Hochschild’s deep acting (see below) is a means to attain the goal of organizationally desired emotions, Hochschild’s and Ashforth and Humphrey’s definition do not seem to be really contradictory. Rather, it is suggested to comply with Ashforth and Humphrey in their emphasis on the visible behavior which is the main goal of emotion work in most cases, but it is also suggested that processes referring to the inner feelings that are intended to support the visible behavior should be part of the emotion work concept at least for two reasons: first, in several professions it is part of the social and professional identity to genuinely feel an emotion, and second, the person may feel hypocritical if she is not able to feel what she should feel (cf. Briner, 1995).

Emotion work possesses the following characteristics (Hochschild, 1983; Morris & Feldman, 1997): (a) emotion work occurs in face-to-face or voice-to-voice interactions with clients; (b) emotions are displayed to influence other people’s emotions, attitudes and behaviors; and (c) the display of emotions has to follow certain rules.

2.1. Emotion work in employee–client interactions

Emotion work is a significant component of jobs that require either face-to-face or voice-to-voice interactions with clients. This refers to the service sector, in particular in the helping professions, but also to teachers, police, correctional workers, debt collectors, and others. It should be noted that not all jobs which require face-to-face interactions with clients belong to
the service sector and that defining service is problematic (Nerdinger, 1994). I will use the term “person-related work” as an umbrella term for all jobs that require face-to-face or voice-to voice interactions with clients in contrast to “object-related work” including both physical and mental work.

2.2. Expressing emotions and influencing the emotions of others

Emotions in person-related jobs are displayed to influence other people’s attitudes and behaviors, usually by influencing their moods or emotions. For example, a child nurse may show sympathy and talk to a hurt child in a soft calming voice to make the child stop crying and cheer her up. The idea that emotion work aims at influencing others which is acknowledged by many authors, is the core of emotion work of Brucks (1998) and Strauss, Farahaugh, Suczek, and Wiener (1980). Strauss et al. define what they call ‘sentimental work’ as work which is a secondary task and has to be carried out especially by considering the responses of the individual at whom the work is done and which services another primary task (Rice, 1963). It aims at influencing the clients’ emotion in contrast to ‘emotional work’ which, according to Strauss et al. means regulating one’s own emotions. Strauss et al. carried out their qualitatively oriented studies in hospitals. Here, the primary task is the diagnosis and treatment of patients. Some of the diagnoses and treatments can cause fear or even panic in the patients. Therefore, sentimental work has to be done to change the patients’ emotions to a desired direction. Sentimental work may be low if it is constrained to polite gestures and remarks. More intensive forms comprise, for example, ‘comfort work,’ if a treatment is hurting, ‘identity work’ to help the patients to keep their head or ‘mourning work’. Based on their observations, the authors maintain that sentimental work sometimes is necessary because otherwise, it would be almost impossible to carry out medical treatment. Locke (1996), who did a participant observation study in a pediatric department of a hospital, described how pediatricians who typically are confronted with fearful children and their parents use ‘comedic performance’ to actively change the children’s and their parents’ negative feelings into positive ones. In a ‘mastery comedy,’ for example, the physician exams a little girl. He starts joking, touches her tummy saying, ‘Is your breakfast there?’ By playing around with her and trying to ‘find her breakfast,’ he obscurrs his primary task of palpating the child’s abdomen and internal organs (p. 51). In other cases, there are ideological reasons to carry out sentimental work and sometimes, it just facilitates the work of nurses and doctors. In most cases, however, this kind of emotion work functions as a secondary task which is carried out in parallel to the primary task, namely the medical diagnosis and treatment.

To be able to manage the clients’ emotions, the accurate perception of their emotions is an important prerequisite. This is in accord with communication psychology (Riggio, 1986) and the literature on emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1998). Riggio operationalized basic social skills which are related to the regulation of emotions and differentiated sensitivity, expression, and control of emotions. Expression and control refer to the emotion work concept described above. Based on the work of these authors, Zapf, Vogt, Seifert, Mertini, and Isic (1999) developed a scale measuring “sensitivity requirements” as the requirement to be sensitive and consider the emotions of clients. Not surprisingly, sensitivity requirements were pos-
itively correlated with emotion expression requirements because the expression of an emotion during an interaction usually is dependent on the emotion of the interaction partner. Only in short script like interactions might a person express emotions without trying to sense the emotion of the other.

2.3. Emotion work and display rules

Goffman (1959) suggested that in every social interaction people follow some rules. Ekman (1973) called the rules about appropriate emotional expression display rules. According to Ekman, the display rules are norms and standards of behavior indicating which emotions are appropriate in a given situation but also how these emotions should be publicly expressed. Hochschild (1983) speaks of feeling rules because in her original concept, the management of inner feelings is crucial, whereas Ashforth and Humphrey (1993), who emphasize the outer expression, prefer to speak of display rules. At present, many companies do not have explicit display rules as a part of the organizational culture or as part of their job descriptions, in particular not in Continental Europe. Most examples come from the US (e.g., Delta Airlines: Hochschild, 1983; Disney: van Maanen and Kunda, 1989; McDonald’s: Leidner, 1993). However, mission statements of companies sometimes incorporate display rules. In the helping professions, institutions often do not have special policies of how to behave, but there exist very clear societal norms and expectations how the professionals should behave. These expectations may be implicitly or explicitly taught in one’s occupational education and become part of one’s professional ethos (e.g., Briner, 1995; Rafaeli and Sutton, 1987). Societal norms may also come into play through the expectations of the clients. In other cases, it may be the professional experience that you cannot sell anything if you are not polite, friendly, and helpful. In such cases, implicit emotional display rules exist through high-performance expectations. Employers differ in their attempts to control and direct how employees display emotions to clients. In some cases, it is part of the supervisors’ jobs to take care that display rules are observed.

While display rules may be explicit in some companies, feeling rules are usually implicit (Briner, 1995, 1999). They may be hidden in metaphors originating from certain organizational cultures. Metaphors, such as ‘family’ or ‘team,’ usually comprise strong messages how to feel.

2.4. Emotion work as a multidimensional construct

Hochschild (1983) described various psychological consequences of emotion work and posited that emotion work is a special far reaching form of human exploitation which even affects the workers’ personalities. Based on qualitative empirical findings she maintained that showing emotions not felt at that moment would lead to the alienation of one’s feelings which would cause psychological ill health. Underlying was a unidimensional concept of emotion work: the more interactions with clients are required, the higher is the frequency of emotion display, the more often emotions have to be shown which are not felt and, consequently, the more negative are the health outcomes. However, studies that operationalized such a unidimensional concept of emotion work (e.g., Adelmann, 1995) could not find the expected
negative relations with psychological strain as suggested by Hochschild. Therefore, other authors have worked on the differentiation of various aspects of emotion work, many of them referring to the seminal work of Morris and Feldman (1996). These aspects included the frequency of emotion display, the attentiveness to display rules required (referring to the intensity and the duration of emotion display), the variety of emotions to be expressed and emotional dissonance.

Frequency of emotional display has been most often investigated. In fact, more or less, all studies that somehow measured emotion work measured the frequency and it was the basic idea of Hochschild (1983) that too frequent emotional displays would overtax the employees and lead to alienation and exhaustion.

Morris and Feldman (1996) suggested *attentiveness* to required display rules as a second dimension of emotion work. They proposed that the more attentiveness to display rules is required the more effort is demanded to carry out emotion work. The authors referred to Rafaeli’s (1989a) and Sutton and Rafaeli’s (1988) work with convenience stores and suggested that the *duration* of interaction is related to the scriptedness of social interactions. Scripts are cognitive schemata available in the long-term memory that comprise information to control routine behavior (Schank & Abelson, 1977). If an interaction is very short, it is likely to be highly scripted. A person controlling tickets for the cinema, for example, may only show a very short smile. Morris and Feldman suggested that the effort involved in these kinds of interaction is lower than in interactions of longer time periods. The emotions in very short interactions are probably of low intensity, whereas it is likely that in longer interactions, more intense emotions have to be displayed, too. The whole process is less scripted. A human resource management consultant, for example, may have overall goals and strategies when conferring with a new client. Depending on what the client is saying, the consultant may spontaneously develop new ideas, plans, suggestions etc. (conscious intellectual regulation, see below). Correspondingly, the emotion display becomes less scripted, too. It is very likely that a constant smile on the consultant’s face would not be adequate. If, for example, the client objects to one of the consultant’s suggestions, a smile might signal that the objection is not taken seriously. Therefore, the consultant would probably try to show a serious expression, and, if the client’s objection is naive, might try to suppress feelings of arrogance and anger. Thus, it is proposed that in interactions with long duration, emotion work is more effortful because it cannot be based on scripts. Second, it is more likely that stronger personal feelings occur because of a higher involvement in the interaction and it may be more effortful to control the suppression of these feelings. This is supported by research on job stress and burnout. In their review on burnout, Cordes and Dougherty (1993) reported that longer interactions with clients were correlated with higher levels of burnout. Morris and Feldman (1997) found empirical evidence that task routineness was negatively correlated with the duration of emotion work episodes.

According to Morris and Feldman (1996), *intensity* of emotional display refers to how strongly an emotion has to be expressed. It may also refer to which emotion is displayed. It is, for example, assumed that satisfaction is a less intensive emotion than happiness and anger or frustration is less intensive than fury. Again, it is argued that displaying intense emotions is more effortful.
A further dimension of Morris and Feldman’s (1996) emotion work concept is the variety of emotions required to be expressed. The requirement to display emotions may be either positive, neutral, for example, in the case of a judge who wants to display dispassionate authority and independence, or negative, e.g., policemen who show severity and anger when communicating with some drunken adolescents. There are some jobs, e.g., supermarket cashiers where the requirement to express a special emotion, such as friendliness, is dominating, and there are others, such as kindergarten teachers, nurses, or psychotherapists where a variety of emotions is required. A typical situation for a kindergarten teacher may be that she expresses cheerfulness to help a crying child to forget that his or her mother has just gone. When a boy comes and shows that he is hurt, the teacher may show sympathy. The next moment, she may share pride and happiness with a little girl who is proudly demonstrating that she just has learned to ride a bicycle. Spotting children beating each other with sticks she may separate the two squabblers while looking very serious at them. Morris and Feldman suggested that emotion work is higher when a higher variety of emotions has to be displayed.

Whereas Morris and Feldman (1996) considered frequency, duration, and intensity to be dimensions of emotion work, other authors (Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Grandey, 1998; Kruml & Geddes, 1998; Zapf et al., 1999) considered them more as job characteristic antecedents or role demands which refer to the tasks given by the organization. Differentiating various dimensions of emotion work, other authors started with Hochschild’s (1983) concept of emotion management (e.g., Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Grandey, 1998; Kruml & Geddes, 1998). Approaches referring to the concept of emotion management differentiated it based on to how emotion work is done. Basically, three emotion management strategies can be differentiated: Automatic emotion regulation, surface acting and deep acting. Doing nothing or failing to manage emotions may lead to emotional deviation.

2.4.1. Automatic emotion regulation

Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) have pointed out that Hochschild’s definition of emotional labor implicitly presumes that performing emotion work necessarily means applying either surface acting or deep acting. They argue, however, that there are many cases where required emotions are spontaneously and genuinely experienced by the employee and proposed that “a nurse who feels sympathy at the sight of an injured child has no need to ‘act’” (p. 94). I call this automatic emotion regulation. On the basis of action theory (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1998), it is proposed that emotion work in this case is done in the ‘automatic mode’ which is supported by emotion theory (Ekman, 1984; Izard, 1977; Scherer & Wallbott, 1990). If a certain emotion is felt, then the expression of this emotion automatically occurs whereby social competence may play a moderator role. That is, the nurse ‘acts’ but does not act ‘consciously.’ Processes under automatic control are typically perceived as effortless (Hacker, 1998). Hochschild called such forms “passive deep acting.”

2.4.2. Surface acting

Most emotion theorists propose that emotions consist of several subsystems (see Scherer, 1997): subjective feeling, physiological reaction patterns and expressive behavior, the latter including facial expression, voice, and gesture. With reference to these concepts, surface
acting means that employees try to manage the visible aspects of emotions that appear on the “surface” and which can be noticed by the interaction partner to bring them in line with the organizational display rules while the inner feelings remain unchanged. Surface acting means that emotional dissonance exists between the inner feelings and the outer expression which persists during the interaction.

Surface acting may sometimes be a problematic strategy because often more is expected than ‘superficial’ emotions. A therapist is expected to be truly interested in the client and not just because he or she is paid for it. Similarly, parents know that child nursing is a job and that the nurses work for money. Nevertheless, they wish that the nurses really love their children. This implies that mechanical conformity with display rules is not enough (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993). In highly standardized situations, it may be easy to fake an emotion. In less standardized situations, there is the danger that the true feelings may lurk through and may be recognized by other people. For example, in the case of expressing positive feelings by smiling, true and faked smiles are proposed to be innervated through different physiological pathways and differ in timing, laterality, and intensity (Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Faked smiling does not activate certain muscle groups in the eye region, is more asymmetric in expression and follows a different time course. In an experimental study on disgust, Gross and Levenson (1993) found that people were quite good in suppressing emotions. However, they could not totally eliminate all expressive signs of disgust. In some cases, authenticity, that is not faking, may even be a key variable, for example, for therapists in encounter therapy (Rogers, 1951).

2.4.3. Deep acting

Another concept of Hochschild (1983) is “active deep acting” when individuals try to influence what they feel in order to ‘become’ the role they are asked to display. In this case, not only the expressive behavior but also the inner feelings are regulated. Active deep acting refers to the case where an employee has to spend effort to regulate emotions. This is so because there is a need to actively strive to invoke thoughts, images, and memories to induce a certain emotion (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993). Examples are that one is thinking of one’s role as a nurse or interrogator (Briner, 1995) or one may use the metaphor of thinking of a difficult passenger as a child that is not responsible for its behavior (Hochschild, 1983). Deep acting may be required when surface acting appears too mechanical to satisfy customers’ expectation of genuine interpersonal relationships.

2.4.4. Emotional dissonance

Most studies of emotion work include the concept of emotional dissonance (e.g., Abraham, 1998; Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Büssing & Glaser, 1999a; Grandey, 1998; Mann, 1999; Morris & Feldman, 1996, 1997; Nerding & Röper, 1999; Zapf, Seifert, Schmutte, Mertini, & Holz, 2001; Zapf et al., 1999). However, its status is seen differently. Some authors treat it as a dimension of emotion work (e.g., Grandey, 1998; Kruml & Geddes, 1998; Morris & Feldman, 1996, 1997), some see it more as a dependent variable (Adelmann, 1995; Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993) while other authors conceptualize it as a stressor that is anchored in the social environment (Zapf et al., 1999).
Emotional dissonance occurs when an employee is required to express emotions which are not genuinely felt in the particular situation. This may be considered as a form of person–role conflict, in which a person’s response is in conflict with role expectations regarding the display of emotions (Abraham, 1998; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). A person may feel nothing when a certain emotion display is required, or the display rule may require the suppression of undesired emotions and the expression of neutrality or a positive emotion instead of a negative one. Emotional dissonance may originate from ‘faking in good faith’ when the employee accepts the underlying display rule or from ‘faking in bad faith’ when the display rule is not accepted (Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). Various authors (e.g., Abraham, 1998; Adelmann, 1995; Nerdinger & Röper, 1999) proposed that faking in bad faith has the most negative consequences.

Emotional dissonance is what was seen as problematic right from the beginning (Hochschild, 1983). Not being able to feel what one should feel may cause the individual to feel false and hypocritical and, in the long run, may lead to the alienation from one’s own emotions, poor self-esteem, and depression. Brotheridge and Lee (1998) proposed and also provided some preliminary evidence that it is emotional dissonance which is related with psychological strain whereas other variables of emotion work were not, except through their relation with emotional dissonance.

Grandey (1998) and Kruml and Geddes (1998) identified two dimensions of emotion work: emotional dissonance and emotional effort. Emotional dissonance in their concept refers to Hochschild’s concept of surface acting and passive deep acting (automatic emotion regulation) which are considered to be the opposite ends of a continuum. If an employee spontaneously feels the emotion, emotional dissonance is low, if he or she feels nothing or the opposite emotion, emotional dissonance is high. Emotional effort refers to the degree to which employees actively try to change their inner feelings to match the feelings they are expected to express. According to Kruml and Geddes, this dimension incorporates Hochschild’s active deep acting. Both dimensions showed a high correlation in the studies of Grandey.

Finally, emotional dissonance was considered as a job demand, more specifically, as an emotion regulation problem (Zapf et al., 1999). As in the other approaches, it is defined as the mismatch between felt emotions and the organizationally desired expression of these emotions. However, emotional dissonance is considered as an external demand rather than a reaction to emotion display or a behavioral strategy. There are good reasons to conceptualize emotional dissonance as an external demand. There are qualitative differences in social situations which are not sufficiently described by the parameters for display rules nor by formal descriptions of emotion work, such as the frequency and duration of emotion work episodes. This is so because the display rules describe the desired state of emotion display, but they do not comprise anything about how often individuals are exposed to situations where they have to show the required emotions. Moreover, they do not reflect other factors, namely how positive or negative the social interaction is which may influence what people feel and whether this fits the emotion required by the display rule for this particular situation. Compare, for example, a nurse in a children’s hospital and a nurse in a senior home. The display rules of showing friendliness and empathy may
be the same, for both nurses, and the frequency and duration of interactions may also be similar, leading to similar required display rates of positive emotions. However, the nurse in the senior people’s home may encounter more situations where an average person spontaneously feels disgust or anger. Similarly, cashiers of a supermarket chain may all have the same requirements to display positive emotions to customers and the number of customers determining the frequency of emotion displays may be similar. However, depending on where a supermarket is located, there may be differing frequencies of encounters with complaining or otherwise negatively behaving customers which is a good predictor of negative emotions of the employee. Consequently, the number of situations where gaps between felt and desired emotions appear, may differ considerably, although the display rules and the requirement to express positive emotions are the same. The discrepancy between what an average person is likely to feel and what the respective display rule is varies from situation to situation. Therefore, the aspects covered by the concept of emotional dissonance are not covered by the frequency and other parameters of emotional requirements because they all refer to the display rules and to more formal characteristics of social interactions, such as frequency and duration, and not to the quality of the actual situations and the resulting differing discrepancies between display rules and average emotions in a given situation.

2.4.5. Deliberative dissonance acting

There is yet another strategy which is mentioned by Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) although in a different context. It is proposed here that there are some circumstances where different rules exist for the display of emotions and the inner feelings whereby internal neutrality is typically required. Ashforth and Humphrey mention the case of medical students who have to learn the “art of detached concern” (Lief and Fox, 1963; Maslach, 1982b). The occupational feeling rules of a medical doctor may often imply the need to display sympathy and understanding while being as calm as possible so as not to be distracted from a difficult treatment which is the primary task. Detached concern means internal emotional neutrality and, at the same time, external display of moderate emotions. I call this deliberative dissonance acting. It is proposed that this occurs if occupational feeling rules exist that comprise both the inner feelings and the expression of emotions whereby the inner feelings have to deviate from the expressed emotions. Briner (1995) argued that it might be a special sign of ‘professionalism’ to be able to maintain a particular emotional display even when felt emotions are very different. This may also apply to professional emotional detachment. Stenross and Kleinman (1989) reported that detectives felt burdened when they had to show both justified and unjustified sympathy toward victims, however, they enjoyed dealing with criminals although the social interaction typically meant negative emotions, personal insults and the like. Dealing with criminals meant ‘real detective work’ and was considered their primary task. “... The detectives found a way to let the criminals’ emotional outbursts or stubborn silences roll off their backs. They discounted criminals’ expressive displays by interpreting them as feigned rather than genuine” (p. 440). The detectives conceived the criminals’ emotional displays as ‘strategic interaction’ and thought of their encounters with criminals as challenging
intellectual games. In this game, they also used their emotion display strategically, e.g., they intentionally played games and they did not intend to feel what they displayed nor were they required to feel what they displayed. Rather, for example, while externally exploding they internally remained cool to trap the criminals. Moreover, detectives had a hard time acting sympathetic towards the victims of a crime when the case and the damage was trivial, e.g., when people had their microwaves stolen (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989). Would the detectives not have looked ‘upset,’ victims might have accused them of indifference and would have complained to their supervisors. In such cases, the clients’ expectations may have clashed with the detectives’ internal feeling rules which may, however, have been in line with their occupational and organizational rules of being detached and neutral. Externally then, they may fulfil the organizational display rule related to customer friendliness and meet the customers’ expectation to be upset, internally they may fulfil their occupational and organizational rule of being detached and neutral.

Whereas in these cases of deliberative dissonance acting, the feeling rules and display rules— although dissonant are rather clear, this is not so in other cases. Bank managers negotiating over a several million dollar mortgage contract with an industry partner may be in a different position because a lot of money is at stake. They may display friendliness and trust while internally being cool representatives of their employers who try to maximize the profit for the organization. Their emotional display results from strategic behavior and there is neither an intention nor a requirement from the organization to ‘feel’ the displayed emotions. One could say that the mere fact that emotions are ‘sold for a wage’ (Hochschild, 1983) implies a contradiction in itself, for example, ‘paid compassion.’ The recipients of emotions in such cases know this exactly, which makes the relation ambiguous, and ambiguity is often a characteristic of emotion work. Brucks (1998), for example, argued that ‘justice’ and ‘care’ are often conflicting guidelines for emotion work. A service provider caring for an elderly person may feel an inner conflict because other customers are waiting. She may show patience and friendliness towards the elderly person but may already start an inner dialog whether it is still fair to spend so much time. Showing empathic emotions may often be a requirement in the helping professions. However, because emotion work is a secondary task which has to be done in parallel with the primary task, being all too empathic may impede the execution of the primary task which may require high attention and inner neutrality. Nerdinger (1994) discussed in detail from the economic point of view, that the work of the service provider is exchanged for money. However, in many cases the full service requires an interaction as if there were not an economic but a family like relation. Thus, a service provider may face contradictory expectations given by the personal interaction with the client (who, for example, may want advice) and the economic interests of his or her employer (who may insist on high sales). Moreover, the requirements of the organization itself may be ambiguous. A computer hot-liner may be required to be customer friendly but, at the same time, limit talks with customers to 5 min. One can hypothesize that such contradictory job requirements are a source of emotional dissonance in any kind of person-related work. In terms of role theory (Katz & Kahn, 1978), these examples of deliberative dissonance acting are mirrored in increased levels of role conflict and role ambiguity which have been found to be predictors of burnout (Lee & Ashforth, 1996).
2.5. Functions of emotion work

What are the goals of emotion work and why are employers interested in it? Emotion work is a part of an overall task and, thus, it helps to fulfil the overall task and increase task effectiveness. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) consider emotion work as a form of impression management because by displaying certain emotions the employee deliberately attempts to foster certain social perceptions of him- or herself. Emotion work is done to influence the emotions of the clients either as the ultimate or as an instrumental goal. In the service business, the premise is that customers or clients would be more likely to do business with an organization when they experience the interaction with service providers positively. This should mainly depend on how far the interaction with the service providers either supports or threatens their self-esteem. Emotion work may help to make the social interaction more predictable and help to avoid embarrassing situations that might otherwise interrupt the interaction with clients (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993). Moreover, emotion work may help to develop trust in the organization, thus, developing or stabilizing the organization–customer relationship. This is more important in the service sector than in other sectors; first, because the assessment of the quality of service is often difficult; second, because the service product is immediately consumed and corrections, such as giving the product back, are not possible (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Nerdinger, 1994); third, emotion work should influence the clients’ emotions thereby influencing their cognitions and behaviors. For example, it is assumed that a customer in a good mood would be more likely to buy things. Fourth, influencing a client’s emotion may make other things easier. A dentist may try to cheer a child up to make the treatment easier. In the entertainment business and in the helping professions, influencing the clients’ emotion may be the ultimate goal itself, e.g., in the case of a psychotherapist who is treating a depressive patient or a hostess in a night club whose goal it is to make customers feel good.

3. Conceptual considerations: emotion work and action theory

Before discussing the consequences of emotion work, I will look at the concept of emotion work from an action theory (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1973, 1998) point of view in order to organize the various aspects of emotion work. “Work” or “labor” is a multidisciplinary concept. Hacker argued that the psychological component of work is the work activity and from the perspective of action theory it is the psychological regulation of work actions. Through various cognitive processes, action theory links the objective work environment to behavior. Working in organizations is goal-directed behavior. Action theory provides a framework to which the concepts of emotion work can be related.

The basic concept of action theory is the hierarchical–sequential organization of action. Work activity consists of a sequence of action steps, directed by a pyramid-like hierarchical structure of goals and subgoals (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1998; Volpert, 1982). Goals regulate actions in the fashion of a cybernetic control loop [cf. Miller, Galanter, and Pribram’s (1960), TOTE unit]. The goal initiates a certain action. By feedback processes, it is tested
whether the goal was attained or not. Each goal can be divided into subgoals. Subgoals again can be divided into sub-subgoals and so forth. Thus, a pyramid-like structure of hierarchically nested goals and subgoals emerges.

Within the pyramid of goals and referring plans, the psychological processes are not all the same. Three levels of action regulation are, therefore, distinguished which are qualitatively different with regard to goals, plans, and feedback processing (Hacker, 1973, 1998): (a) the intellectual level of action regulation, (b) the level of flexible action patterns, and (c) the sensorimotor level of action regulation.

a) On the intellectual level, complex analyses of situations and actions concerning problem solutions are regulated (Hacker, 1998). New action programs are designed comprising analysis of goals and environmental conditions, problem solving, and decision making. Action regulation on this level is necessarily conscious. It is slow, laborious, resource-limited, and works in a serial mode, interpreting feedback step-by-step (cf. Shiffrin & Schneider’s, 1977, controlled processing).

b) At the level of flexible action patterns, routine actions are controlled. Routine actions have been carried out frequently and are regulated by action patterns stored in the long-term memory which can be conceptualized as schemata (cf. Norman, 1981). The script concept of Schank and Abelson (1977) also comes close to the concept of action patterns. Action patterns are ready-made action programs (plans) that are available in memory and that have to be specified to situationally defined parameters. These action programs have been previously established and have to be activated and integrated into an action chain for a specific situation. The regulation of routine action cannot be fully automatized but requires only little attention.

c) The sensorimotor level is the lowest level of regulation. Stereotyped and automatic movement sequences are organized without conscious attention at this level. Regulation takes place with the help of proprioceptive and exteroceptive feedback. This type of regulation is largely unconscious and is done with little subjective effort. The concept of automatic processing (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) can be applied here. Information processing at this level is parallel, rapid, effortless, and without apparent limitations. Conscious regulation has some difficulty to modify action programs at the sensorimotor level. It can stop the action but it is much more difficult to modify an automatized action that is in progress. Because of parallel information processing at this level, the execution and coordination of parallel movements or other processes, such as speech production, is possible and typically the case. What makes behavior at this level difficult is the number of movements to be coordinated, their timing, and their accuracy.

Tasks differ in how they require the regulation of action at these levels. Very simple tasks, e.g., done at the assembly line may be done without any need for intellectual action regulation but may be done routinely, mostly regulated at the sensorimotor level. Other tasks may require a lot of problem solving and, thus, may require intellectual action regulation. But even problem solving tasks comprise subtasks that can be routinely done and that are regulated at the two lower levels of action regulation. As mentioned above, a typical task of helping
professionals or service providers consists of both object- and person-related subtasks. An example is a nurse who has to take blood from a patient. While preparing the injection and sticking the patient’s arm, she talks to the patient in a calming voice. It is assumed here that emotion work is a subtask of an overall task, the execution of which has to be done in parallel to object-related task execution (see Fig. 1). This can be done without problems if the expression of emotions in mimic, voice, and gesture is regulated automatically at the sensorimotor level. If a person automatically feels the desired emotion, this will automatically activate the motor schemata for the display of the respective emotion. This all is done unconsciously and without psychological effort. Emotion work as a secondary task which is related to an object-related primary task is shown in Fig. 1.

Using an action theory framework, the psychological focus is on the regulation of emotions according to a goal given by the organization. In this sense, emotion work is part of intentional and goal-directed behavior. An employee receives an order from the organization to carry out a certain task in a certain way. The order is redefined into a subjective task (Hackman, 1970) which requires the development of goals and plans to carry out the task. Often, tasks comprise multiple goals which have to be integrated into an overall plan (Frese & Zapf, 1994). For some goals, the respective actions can be brought into a sequential order, other goals require to carry out actions in parallel or they refer to how the action is carried out. One goal is to carry out emotion work, that is behaving according to the emotional display rules of the organization. In Fig. 1, the display rules are part of the organization. Taking over an order includes the expectation of the organization to carry out emotion work according to the display rules of the organization. Therefore, the display rules also undergo the process of

![Organisation Display Rules](image.png)

Fig. 1. Organization display rules.
redefinition and form the goals for emotion work. Emotion work usually is a secondary task serving a primary task and, thus, refers to a subgoal of a higher order goal referring to the primary task. It requires certain emotion displays and, in some cases, the management of inner feelings during an interaction with a client. Ideally, emotion work is done in the automatic mode (automatic emotion regulation), that is, the emotion is automatically shown in the social interaction as required (cf. Scherer & Wallbott, 1990). The display of emotion in this case is exclusively regulated at the sensorimotor level of action regulation. It is effortless and can easily be done in parallel with the primary task.

If the person does not feel what he or she ought to feel, the person may react with surface acting. This process is probably triggered at the level of flexible action patterns. This implies that it is partly a routine process, which can but need not involve conscious processes. The goal to show a certain emotion which is not felt is routinely activated; however, the motor schemata are again controlled at the sensorimotor level without conscious control. For example, while feeling neutral, a salesperson discussing terms of sale with a customer may show a constant smile. Only occasionally, this will come to the conscious attention of the salesperson. He or she may then refresh the effort to keep on smiling by just thinking “Smile!” and may then focus the attention back on the sales talk again.

In contrast, most authors assume that deep acting is effortful. In action theory terms, this means that deep acting partly involves conscious processes at the intellectual level of action regulation. If done in an ongoing interaction when working on a primary object-related task, this would interrupt or, at least, interfere with the cognitive regulation processes necessary to regulate the object-oriented parts of the overall tasks. It can, therefore, be assumed that deep acting is either a relatively independent subtask, which is done in preparation for a difficult social interaction, or it is possible to interrupt the primary task and carry out deep acting. An example for the first possibility is a nurse who behaved coldly toward an elderly patient and who starts an internal dialog. She may ask herself why she is having such difficulties with the particular patient and why she cannot fulfill her own standards of nurse–patient interaction in this case. She may then try and develop more positive emotions with regard to this patient in preparation for the next time. Another example of a flight attendant who is trying to stop feelings of anger at an annoying passenger is reported by Hochschild (1983, p. 55): “I may just talk to myself: ‘Don’t let him get to you. Don’t let him get to you...’ And I talk to my partner and she’ll say the same thing to me. After a while, the anger goes away.” It is assumed that such inner dialogs do not work spontaneously during an interaction because deep acting is often a consciously regulated process which cannot be carried out in parallel to other conscious processes because of the sequential information processing at the intellectual level of action regulation (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hacker, 1998). This view of deep acting is also supported by its origin in the education of actors (Hochschild, 1983). Actors would not start the process of deep acting when on stage. Rather, they would apply this strategy while learning the role.

There are various possibilities how emotion work can be processed during an interaction. (a) At the beginning of the interaction with the client, the expected emotion may be spontaneously experienced and displayed. Then there is emotional harmony (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987), that is concordance between the emotion desired by the organization, the felt
and the displayed emotion. Emotion work is done in the automatic mode and experienced as effortless. No conscious attention is needed to regulate the display of emotions and the employee can fully concentrate on the primary task. If the emotion is not spontaneously experienced and displayed, the employee can use surface or deep acting. (b) In a routine situation, surface acting may also be automatized. For example, although feeling nothing, a salesperson may automatically show a smile (a “phony” smile according to Ekman & Friesen, 1982). In other cases, surface acting may be consciously initiated. An implementation intention (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1993) is activated (“When a customer comes in, I’ll smile”). This implementation intention is conscious but needs not be elaborated. The person will start smiling, the expression of which involves automatically activated motor schemata. Surface acting keeps the employee in a state of emotional dissonance during the interaction. Because emotional dissonance is a state and not a process, it does not describe a process of emotion work. Rather, the respective process is surface acting. (c) In the case of deep acting, the person actively tries to influence the inner feelings to bring them in line with the emotions required by the organization. Because deep acting often contains conscious regulation, this is only possible if the primary task is interrupted (as in the case of the flight attendant who leaves the situation and talks to her colleague), or if a part of the primary task can be done routinely with little attention. In such a case, deep acting may involve starting an inner dialog that may eventually enable him or her to feel the required emotion. Although, it can take conscious effort to initiate the desired emotional state by deep acting, expressing the emotion after successful deep acting requires less effort. Since the emotion is actually felt then, the expression becomes automatic. (d) Finally, it may be the case that the required emotion is not expressed. This is called emotional deviance (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987) and might occur intentionally because the employee does not agree with the organizational display rules, or unintentionally because the employees tries, but is not able to show the desired emotion, perhaps due to emotional exhaustion.

3.1. Emotion work requirements as job characteristics

Several authors have discussed aspects of the emotion work concept as job characteristics (e.g., Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Zapf et al., 1999). There may be some confusion among the concepts of demands, determinants or requirements, and dimensions of emotion work. These conceptual problems are well known in the stress research and job analysis literature (e.g., Frese & Zapf, 1988, 1994; Kasl, 1986; Semmer, 1991; Spector, 1992). It is mainly a question of perspective. Dimensions of emotion work should reflect the psychological processes that happen when emotion work is carried out. In this sense, it refers to individual work behavior. However, there are usually objective requirements and restrictions on how work has to be carried out. Of course, a high correlation between the requirements and the actual work behavior can be assumed. Whether the preference is on the work requirements or on the work strategies depends on the context and practical purposes. If the focus is on work design, the emotion work requirements are important and one might be interested to assess these requirements independent of a particular worker. If the focus is on training or coping with emotion work requirements, one might concentrate on the emotion work strategies. To make a
clear conceptual distinction between requirements or demands on the one hand and
dimensions of emotion work or emotion work strategies on the other, it makes most sense
to consider emotion work requirements as “objective” in the sense of being independent of
subjective interpretations or interindividual differences. For example, the organizational
requirement to smile during service encounters is independent of a particular worker. This
does not, of course, insure that a worker who is required to smile will actually do so. As
mentioned above, controversial views exist with regard to emotional dissonance. Some
authors have suggested that it is reasonable to consider emotional dissonance as part of real
job behavior, namely whether an employee does or does not feel the required emotion in a
given situation. However, emotional dissonance can also be viewed as a job requirement
(Zapf et al., 1999). This is so because it is likely that a good prediction can be made when a
person does not feel what he or she ought to feel independent of the particular individual. If a
service provider has to interact with an aggressive, arrogant, or even insulting customer, it can
be assumed that the large majority of service providers will not automatically experience the
warmth and friendliness mandated by the display rules of their organization.

From an action theory perspective, three aspects of characteristics of a job or task are
distinguished: regulation requirements, regulation possibilities, and regulation problems (for
details, see Frese & Zapf, 1994; Zapf, 1993). The term regulation stands for the internal
cognitive processes of goal and plan development, the transformation of goals and plans into
actions, monitoring, and feedback processing. Regulation requirements, in particular job
complexity, are related to properties of the hierarchical–sequential organisation of action and
comprise the complexity of decisions, the number and connectedness of goals and subgoals,
and the extent of conscious vs. automatic regulation processes. Accordingly, a problem-
solving kind of task is considered to be high in regulation requirements, whereas loading and
printing a document may be considered as a routine task that can be carried out using scripts
or action schemata stored in memory and adapted for the particular situation. Here, regulation
requirements are low. Regulation possibilities refer to the concept of control. Control means
having an impact on one’s conditions and on one’s activities in correspondence with some
goal. Decision possibilities exist with regard to the sequence of the action steps, the timeframe
and the content of goals and plans (Frese, 1987). Several authors have operationalized various
aspects of control, such as task control referring to decision possibilities regarding the goals to
be carried out, the sequence of plans to be performed and the sequence of feedback
information processing. Time control, for example, refers to both when and for how long a
certain task is performed (e.g., Frese & Zapf, 1994; Wall, Jackson, Mullarkey, & Parker, 1996;
Zapf, 1993). Regulation problems are an action theory conceptualisation of work stressors.
The stressors are differentiated according to how they disturb the regulation of actions (Frese
& Zapf, 1994; Greiner & Leitner, 1989; Semmer, 1984). Examples are that conflicting goals
have to be achieved causing uncertainty how to proceed, or information which should be at
hand, is not available, and additional effort is necessary to get that information.

There is evidence that regulation requirements, regulation possibilities, and regulation
problems are differentially related to health and well being. This differentiation stands in
contrast to a more simplistic stimulus–response framework, in which every characteristic of
the job has negative consequences and “doing nothing” would be the best way to avoid stress
at work. Action theory proposes that human beings usually try to actively cope with their environment. In this sense, job design should support this active approach by providing challenging (i.e., sufficiently complex) tasks (regulation requirements) and control (regulation possibilities), while reducing the stressors (regulation problems). Regulation requirements are relevant to the concept of personality enhancement (Hacker, 1973, 1998; see also Frese & Zapf, 1994). This means that they enable one to develop cognitive and social skills, which promote satisfaction and self-esteem. They follow the person–environment fit model (Edwards & van Harrison, 1993): They are positive as long as they are matched by personal prerequisites and they become negative when they exceed them. Research shows that regulation possibilities (control) typically show a direct positive effect, as well as a moderating effect, between stressors and strains (e.g., Kahn & Byosiere, 1992). In contrast, regulation problems (stressors) have negative health effects. Stressors are in a sense independent of the person–environment fit because people want challenging tasks, but they do not need a minimal amount of conflicts, time pressure, or superfluous organizational problems to feel happy. The key concepts of emotion work requirements, emotion work strategies, and their hypothesized relations to burnout are summarized in Fig. 2.

Not all relations are depicted in the figure. For example, it can be assumed that the display of positive and negative emotions can be related to both automatic emotion regulation, deep

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**Fig. 2. Emotion work strategies.**
acting, and surface acting, as well as to emotional deviance, if the person does not respond at all to the emotional job demands. However, it is assumed and supported by data in the next section, that the requirement to display positive emotions and negative emotions is mostly related to automatic emotion regulation which is related to personal accomplishment and surface acting, which is related to emotional exhaustion and depersonalization. Emotional dissonance is considered a stressor (emotion regulation problem) with positive relations with exhaustion and depersonalization. By definition, emotional dissonance is not related to automatic emotion regulation. The most frequent reaction should be surface acting. Also, it can be assumed that if the person is either not willing or not able to show the desired emotion, emotional deviance will result. The response to sensitivity requirements is normally that the emotion is actually sensed. Of course, there are cases where the person either does not care or is not able to sense the emotion of the interaction partner. It is assumed that sensitivity requirements lead both to personal accomplishment and emotional exhaustion and depersonalization.

Automatic emotion regulation, surface acting, and deep acting are emotion work strategies used to manage emotion regulation requirements and problems. The more automatic emotion regulation is involved, the higher is the likelihood of positive consequences, such as personal accomplishment. If surface acting and deep acting have to be used, this is related to emotional exhaustion and depersonalization. Deep acting may also contribute to personal accomplishment because it may be used in successful social interactions. If emotional deviance occurs because the individual either does not intend to show the required emotion or is not able to do so, then emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and reduced personal accomplishment is expected. In a hospital study of Büsing and Glaser (1999a), emotional deviance was positively associated with emotional exhaustion and negatively associated with job satisfaction.

In the following section, I will apply this action theory perspective to emotion work to explain the contradictory findings of effects of emotion work on job satisfaction and burnout. It will be suggested that concepts referring to the frequency of expressing emotions and sensing the emotions of others behave like regulation requirements whereas emotional dissonance behaves like a regulation problem (stressor).

4. Consequences of emotion work

The first studies on emotion work mostly were focussed on performance (e.g., Rafaeli, 1989a, 1989b; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1990; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988) It is only recently that authors tried to investigate the relationships between more direct measures of emotion work and psychological strain (e.g., Abraham, 1998; Adelmann, 1995; Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Grandey, 1998; Morris & Feldman, 1997; Zapf et al., 1999, 2001), in particular burnout and job satisfaction.

4.1. Emotion work and burnout

Most empirical studies so far analyzed relationships between aspects of emotion work and emotional exhaustion, which is a key component of burnout. Burnout was first investigated in
the helping professions (e.g., Maslach, 1982a, 1982b; Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998). It started with observations that the personal relationships with patients, clients, or children are sometimes emotionally very demanding and require a high amount of empathy and emotional involvement. This is usually combined with high initial expectations to do a good job. In these professions, the management of emotions is considered a central part of work. Burnout is then an indication that employees are no longer able to adequately manage their emotions when interacting with clients. Recent developments (Schaufeli, Leiter, Maslach, & Jackson, 1996) have extended the concepts to jobs without direct client contact. There is evidence that burnout has negative implications for organizations (e.g., Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998). First, burnout is related to decreased performance and, second, there is evidence for burnout contagion. Through various mechanisms members of work groups get ‘infected’ and show similarly high levels of burnout.

Burnout is a syndrome consisting of three aspects: emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and reduced personal accomplishment occurring among individuals who do ‘people work’ (Maslach & Jackson, 1986, p. 1). It is argued that, in the long run, burnout leads to psychosomatic complaints, depression, and other long term stress effects. A recent meta-analysis (Lee & Ashforth, 1996) of the existing literature found variables, such as workload, role stress, and role conflict, to be among the best predictors of burnout variables. Interestingly, studies on burnout did not try to directly measure the emotional aspects of work demands. Rather, these aspects were taken as a given by doing research with samples where emotional job requirements could be taken for granted. Instead, some of the studies measured various job stressors, such as role conflict, and resources, such as job control. Other studies used indirect measures, such as caseloads and number of difficult clients. It is only recently that burnout researchers started to integrate emotion work into concepts of burnout.

Emotional exhaustion refers to the depletion or draining of emotional resources. People feel that all their energy is lost; they feel at the end of their rope (Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998). Both Maslach and Jackson (1984a) and Pines and Aronson (1988) proposed that excessive emotional demands are responsible for the development of burnout. Maslach (1982a, 1982b) argued that interactions with clients are often inherently difficult and upsetting because health professionals deal with troubled people. She proposed that frequent face-to-face interactions which are intense, emotionally charged and of a longer duration are associated with higher levels of emotional exhaustion. Empirical research on burnout, however, has found that variables that might indicate high emotional demands, such as frequent interactions with clients, high caseloads, and severe clients problems, were less correlated with exhaustion than were job stressors, such as workload or role conflicts. Schaufeli and Enzmann (1998, p. 84) concluded: “Hence, it seems that, on empirical grounds, the assertion that burnout is particularly related to emotionally charged interactions with clients has to be refuted.” Reviewing the literature on caseload and burnout, Koeske and Koeske (1989) found mixed results. In particular, the sheer number of client contacts seemed not to be a good predictor of burnout whereas the relative amount of negative as opposed to positive client contacts was a better indicator.

The empirical findings on the relation between emotion work and emotional exhaustion are unequivocal for emotional dissonance. Significant positive correlations across twelve studies
ranged from .20 to .48 with a sample size weighted mean correlation of $r = .32$ (total $N = 3199$; Abraham, 1998; Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Grandey, 1998; Kruml & Geddes, 1998; Morris & Feldman, 1997; Nerdinger & Röper, 1999; Zapf et al., 1999, 2001). In addition, Morris and Feldman (1997) found a weak but significant negative correlation between the frequency of emotion work operationalized as the frequency of interaction and exhaustion. Zapf et al. also found that emotional exhaustion was positively correlated with the requirement to display and handle negative emotions and the requirement to be sensitive to the emotions of others in five different samples (handicapped children’s home, call centers, hotel business, banking sector, and kindergartens). As an indicator for deep acting, Kruml and Geddes (1998) measured “emotional effort” spent in a job, which was also positively related with exhaustion.

Only a few studies analyzed relations with the other burnout dimensions. One concept is depersonalization, which points to the development of negative callous or cynical attitudes towards clients. Often, the clients are labeled in a derogatory way and treated accordingly (Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998). In the helping professions, depersonalization often means treating people like objects. Kruml and Geddes (1998), and Zapf et al. (1999) found a positive relation between emotional dissonance and depersonalization. Moreover, the requirement to express negative emotions and sense the emotions of others were positively related to depersonalization with the exception of the children’s home sample (Zapf et al., 1999, 2001). Nerdinger and Röper (1999) operationalized “emotional dissonance — faking in good face” using items, such as “I console the patients even if I am not in the right mood,” and found a positive correlation between this scale and depersonalization. The explanation is that individuals who accept the display rules will not use depersonalization to cope with high emotional demands.

With regard to depersonalization, a methodological note is necessary. Semmer (1996) criticized that there is often no clear distinction between coping strategies and psychological outcome variables, a critique that also applies to the concept of depersonalization. Depersonalization is related to detachment which is described as a useful strategy to handle interactions with clients. Depersonalization as a subconstruct of burnout then means that a person is no longer able to adequately use this strategy. Instead of adapting detachment to the situation, detachment becomes permanent and the person is chronically unable to feel what he or she should feel.

The third dimension of burnout is lack of personal accomplishment, which is the tendency to evaluate one’s work with clients negatively. The belief that one is no longer able to achieve one’s goals in work with clients is accompanied by feelings of inefficiency and poor professional self-esteem (Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998). In the study of Kruml and Geddes (1998), emotional dissonance was negatively related with personal accomplishment, whereas in the samples of Zapf et al. (1999, 2001), the findings were mixed. However, the requirement to display positive emotions and to be sensitive toward the emotion of others was positively correlated with personal accomplishment in all samples. In the study of Nerdinger and Röper (1999), emotional dissonance-faking in good faith showed a positive correlation with personal accomplishment whereas emotional dissonance-faking in bad faith did not. The authors argue that in the case of accepting the display rules, being able to show the desired emotion can be interpreted as a sign of professionalism contributing to the feeling of personal accomplishment.
The relations between emotion work scales and personal accomplishment may indicate that ‘difficult clients’ may not necessarily be a ‘pure’ stressor as proposed in the burnout literature. Rather, they may be perceived as a challenge, depending on what the work task is and whether the difficulty is ‘reasonable.’ For psychotherapists, depressive adolescents might be ‘interesting and challenging cases’ whereas they may be ‘difficult students’ and a cause of strain for their teachers. Also, bank employees who see their primary tasks in financial transactions might interpret every negative interaction with a customer as difficult whereas the employees in the grievance department consider dealing with these customers as their regular work. Hence, it is proposed that it depends on the work tasks and whether the ‘difficult client’ is considered a central part of the job or a hassle that makes the job unnecessarily difficult. Summarizing the existing results, the expression of positive emotions and the requirement to sense emotions of others contribute to the feeling of personal accomplishment, whereas for emotional dissonance, the findings are mixed. In some studies, emotional dissonance may indicate failure to adequately handle a social interaction, thus, contributing to the reduction of personal accomplishment. In other occasions, emotional dissonance may be seen as a natural and unavoidable part of one’s task which is emotionally exhausting. However, if individuals are able to cope with it, they may feel that they can manage even difficult social interactions. This may increase the feeling of personal accomplishment. From a methodological perspective, it has to be taken into consideration that the frequencies of emotion display and emotional dissonance both depend on the frequency of social interactions. They are, therefore, positively correlated. Because there is a strong positive correlation between the requirement to express positive emotions and personal accomplishment, there should also be a positive though lower correlation between emotional dissonance and personal accomplishment due to the correlational pattern of positive emotions display, emotional dissonance, and personal accomplishment. It can be hypothesized that this implicit positive effect of emotional dissonance on personal accomplishment (which would disappear if positive emotions display were partialled out) balances the ‘true’ negative relation between emotional dissonance and personal accomplishment.

Similar results as for burnout were found with regard to psychosomatic complaints and irritation. Zapf et al. (1999) found positive correlations between psychosomatic complaints and irritation and emotional dissonance (between .35 and .40) and somewhat lower correlations for sensitivity requirements.

Few correlations with burnout were found for intensity or duration of the interaction. This may be due to methodological problems. Interactions involving high intensity might occur less frequently. As a result, evidence of negative effects of less intense emotions might be stronger due to their higher baserate relative to more intense emotions. Similarly, a person could have very few interactions of a long duration, yet score high on this dimension.

To conclude, the findings on emotion work and burnout support previous burnout research: When emotion work was primarily operationalized by the frequency of client contacts, the relations were low. When the interaction was qualified as negative as in the case of emotional dissonance, which refers to discrepancies between felt and expressed emotions, then significant correlations occurred.
4.2. Emotion work and job satisfaction

Several studies have analyzed the relations between emotion work and job satisfaction. Based on Hochschild’s (1983) view that emotion work would cause alienation and estrangement from one’s feelings, it was hypothesized that emotion work would be negatively correlated with job satisfaction. However, the empirical findings provide mixed support for this view. In an early study, Rutter and Fielding (1988) found that the need to suppress genuinely felt emotions showed a negative correlation with job satisfaction. A negative relation between emotional dissonance and job satisfaction was found by Abraham (1998), Morris and Feldman (1997), Schmutte (1999), and Zapf et al. (1999).

Wharton (1993), however, found a positive relationship between emotion work and job satisfaction in a sample including various job categories, and Adelmann (1995) did so for a sample of table servers. Morris and Feldman (1997) found a positive correlation between the frequency of emotion work and job satisfaction, and Schmutte (1999) did so for expressing positive emotions and job satisfaction in a sample of banking employees. However, Zapf et al. (1999) were not able to replicate these results.

In sum, the studies show that emotional dissonance is negatively correlated with job satisfaction whereas for the frequency of emotion display the results are equivocal. One can only speculate why this is so. Since all studies use overall job satisfaction measures, the relative meaning of emotion work compared to other aspects of the job may be important. In some jobs, the primary task and its complexity, as well as job control and the social relationships with supervisors and colleagues, might simply be more important. In some jobs, emotion work might be associated with rewards, e.g., better sales or positive feedback from clients or customers, whereas in other jobs this is not the case. Further research is necessary to give answer to these questions.

4.3. Interaction effects

Stress research has demonstrated that it is not only the stressors that are relevant for strain but that there are also resources, such as control or social support (cf., e.g., Kahn & Byosiere, 1992), that buffer the negative effects of work stressors. Initial evidence suggests this applies to the effects of emotion work as well.

4.3.1. Emotion work and job control

Various authors suggested investigating the relations between job control or autonomy and emotion work. In his qualitative study on supermarket clerks’ performance, Tolich (1993) argued that the presence or absence of control over one’s emotion display is one of the important issues of emotion work. He differentiated regulated emotion management from autonomous emotion management based on whether or not one has influence on the displayed emotions. For example, waitresses in restaurants may have to follow certain display rules, but there may be differences in how often and in what cases the waitresses are empowered to deviate from the rules.
In the stress literature, authors have investigated direct effects of control on health, indirect effects whereby control reduces stressors, which in turn reduce ill health, and moderating effects of control on stressor–strain relations (Frese, 1989; Kahn & Byosiere, 1992; Karasek & Theorell, 1990). Morris and Feldman (1996) suggested the research on stress and control might also be applied to emotion work. Accordingly, individuals with high job control would have the possibility to decide whether or not to follow a display rule in a given situation. Individuals high in control may be able to adapt display to their personality and individual styles, and by this may reduce emotional dissonance, whereas individuals low in control may not.

Those authors who used general control scales found a significant negative correlation between emotional dissonance and control (Abraham, 1998; Morris & Feldman, 1997). Zapf et al. (1999) found some evidence for similar correlations for interaction control, i.e., the degree to which an employee can influence the social interaction with clients and emotional dissonance.

Erickson (1991, cited in Abraham, 1998) found a moderating effect of control for the emotion work–well-being relationship. In a sample of hotel employees, Seifert, Mertini and Zapf (1999) used general participation (influence on decisions regarding planning vacations, composition of the workgroup, new machinery, etc.), task-related control and interaction control as moderators for emotion work (negative emotions display and emotional dissonance) and burnout (emotional exhaustion and depersonalization). Effects were found for task-related control and general participation, but not for interaction control. These results were replicated in the banking sample of Schmutte (1999).

To summarize, relations between control and emotional dissonance and interaction effects were found in various studies as one would expect when generalizing research on stress and control to emotion work. This is an important finding because it implies opportunities to design emotion work jobs. It should be mentioned that control in person-related work is more problematic than in object-related work. Increasing control to improve working conditions has been one of the most important postulates of work psychologists for decades (see, e.g., Ulich 1998). In a social situation, however, increasing control of one person may mean limiting the control of the other, a problem which has old philosophical roots. Rafaeli (1989a, 1989b), for example, describes the strategies of a supermarket cashier who struggles for control with a customer. The exertion of control of teachers, nurses or physicians may easily be perceived as authoritarian behavior by students or patients.

4.3.2. Emotion work and social support

Social support is another extensively researched concept in organizational stress research (e.g., Cohen & Wills, 1985; Kahn & Byosiere, 1992). Similar to control at work, social support has a direct positive effect on health, an indirect effect on health via the reduction of job stressors and there is some evidence for a moderating effect implying that the correlation between stressors and strains is high when social support is low. There is some research on social support and emotion work. An individual may receive direct instrumental support—a nurse may take over a patient her colleague does not get along with. Or one may receive emotional support by a colleague after a difficult talk with a customer by venting the true feelings to the colleague (cf. House, 1981). Some support for the moderating effect of social
support can be found in the study of Abraham (1998) for emotional dissonance and job satisfaction as the dependent variable, in the study of Schmutte (1999) for emotional dissonance and emotional exhaustion as the dependent variable, and in the study of Seifert et al. (1999) for emotional dissonance, and emotional exhaustion and depersonalization as the dependent variables. In the study of Abraham, for example, the negative relation of emotional dissonance and job satisfaction appeared only when social support was low whereas there was a slight increase of job satisfaction when emotional dissonance was high under high-support conditions. Obviously, social support was powerful enough to prevent emotional dissonance from negatively affecting job satisfaction. The opposite regression line for high support may indicate that the underlying social situation may be challenging and interesting and that with the support of supervisors and colleagues, the employees can cope with emotional dissonance.

4.3.3. Emotion work and job stressors

Reviews on burnout (Lee & Ashforth, 1996; Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998) show that although original concepts of burnout considered emotional demands to be the key antecedent of burnout, empirical research showed that organizational job stressors, such as high workload, time pressure, and role conflicts, showed the strongest associations with burnout. Several points should be noted here. First, most of the early burnout concepts saw in emotional demands a key role or a precondition for the occurrence of burnout, but most approaches maintained that organizational conditions were highly relevant when the employees’ job expectation were not met. Second, there is actually a conceptual overlap between task-related and interaction-related predictors of burnout (cf. Schaufeli & Enzmann, 1998): High caseload, for example, may contribute to time pressure. Complicated cases may contribute to task complexity and task uncertainty. Thus, what is sometimes considered as impersonal task characteristics could also be related to person-related work. Based on the burnout concepts, which hold the cooccurrence of high emotional demands and a negative organizational environment important for the development of burnout, one would expect that both emotion work and task-related stressors uniquely contribute to burnout. This would, for example, be predicted by the dual-level social exchange model of Schaufeli, van Drenendonck, and van Gorp (1996). The authors proposed that reciprocity, the balance of investments and gains, plays a major role in the development of burnout. When individuals perceive a relationship as unbalanced they feel distressed and try to restore reciprocity. Depersonalization can then be regarded as a way of restoring reciprocity by withdrawing psychologically from the clients (Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999). According to the dual level exchange model of burnout, lack of reciprocity can occur at the interpersonal level where emotion work is relevant, and at the organizational level, where task-related and organizational stressors are relevant. Social workers, for example, cannot expect that their feelings are returned by drug addicts. Rather, the emotional investments into the clients have to be balanced by the organization they work for, perhaps in the form of recognition or avoidance of unreasonable organizational problems or workload. It follows that the coincidence of high emotional demands and high organizational problems should be related to high levels of burnout. Zapf et al. (2001) and Nerdinger and Röper (1999) compared the relations of task
characteristics, social working conditions, and emotion work on burnout using hierarchical regression. Entering emotion work variables as the final block after task-related variables and social variables, such as social stressors and support, emotion work variables significantly explained variance in burnout variables in most cases although there was a substantial proportion of shared variance between the predictor groups. Moreover, Zapf et al. found interaction effects between task-related stressors, such as time pressure, organizational problems, and uncertainty of goal attainment on the one hand, and emotional dissonance on the other, when predicting emotional exhaustion.

5. Conclusions

Summarizing the empirical findings of the relation between emotion work and psychological strain and satisfaction, patterns similar to other areas in stress research can be found. The results presented in the last sections show the ambivalent character of emotion work. There are both positive consequences of emotion work, such as job satisfaction or the feeling of personal accomplishment, and negative consequences, such as emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, or psychosomatic complaints. This underscores that emotion work is a multidimensional construct. There are several authors who have suggested that emotion work would have both costs and benefits. Three lines of arguments support the beneficial effects of emotion work: (1) emotion work reduces potential negative effects of work; (2) emotion work induces positive emotions; and (3) emotion work fulfils needs and expectations.

1. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) suggested that one of the beneficial outcomes of emotion work is that it would help making interactions more predictable, thus, reducing uncertainty at work. A person treated friendly is likely to react friendly in return. Moreover, it would help to avoid embarrassing interpersonal problems; and it would help the employees to distance themselves from unpleasant situations.

2. Adelmann (1995) referred to the facial feedback hypothesis, which proposes that facial expression alters or initiates subjective feelings through a physiological feedback mechanism. There is at least some evidence for the weak form of this hypothesis (Scherer & Wallbott, 1990). For example, in an experiment of Strack, Stepper, and Martin (1988), there was one group of participants whose muscle groups necessary for laughing were stimulated by holding a pen in the teeth and another group of participants where the muscles were inhibited by holding a pen in the lips and forming the lips as if they were whistling. The first group with activated laughing muscles found a movie more funny in comparison to the group whose laughing muscles were inhibited. That is, a person pretending to have positive emotions by showing ‘phony’ smiles, may end up in true smiles because of the facial feedback mechanisms. Moreover, the display of positive emotions which are not felt, may nevertheless cause the customer to smile in return. The employee may then develop true positive feelings in the course of the interaction. This might be explained by emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), positive feedback loops, or social exchange theories (Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999).
3. Action theory emphasizes that human beings actively approach their environment and that managing demands contributes to what Hacker (1998) called ‘personality enhancement,’ which includes all kinds of competencies, satisfaction and self-esteem. Regulation requirements (complexity) and regulation possibilities (control) have these positive effects because they address various human needs (to feel competent, pride). In contrast, regulation problems make working difficult or unpleasant and, most importantly, they do not address needs. Applying these ideas to emotion work, emotional dissonance follows the logic of regulation problems whereas the other aspects of emotion work follow the logic of regulation requirements. They address several needs, such as affiliation needs, application of social competencies, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and recognition. People may be proud to handle complex social interactions and demonstrate emotional intelligence as they are proud to handle complex computer tasks. Tolich (1993), for example, described supermarket clerks who genuinely enjoyed organizationally prescribed emotions in the form of jokes, other kinds of entertainment and special services for particular customers. By the customers’ responses they were obviously rewarded for demonstrating these kinds of social skills.

It can be hypothesized that high emotion regulation requirements have a different meaning dependent on the occupation. Helping professionals might consider it as a central part of their job to interact with their clients and deal with both pleasant and unpleasant emotions. A situation high in sensitivity requirements or frequent negative emotions display may — although emotionally demanding — be interpreted as a challenge. A social worker who has to manage a complicated conflict situation with drug addicts may be exposed to high sensitivity requirements, frequent positive and negative emotions display, and also emotional dissonance. After this situation, he or she may breathe a sigh of relief and experience emotional exhaustion and the feeling of pride and personal accomplishment at the same time. Computer hotliners in a call center may believe that the solution of hard and software problems is their primary job. For them, a negative social interaction with a customer is not at all a challenge but an unreasonable demand. This differing interpretation may explain the high correlation between depersonalization and the requirement to display negative emotions in the children’s home sample in contrast to the low and insignificant correlations in the hotel and call center samples of Zapf et al. (1999).

Several authors suggested that emotion work and especially the frequency of emotional dissonance would be dependent on personality variables, such as positive or negative affect and extraversion (e.g., Abraham, 1998; Morris & Feldman, 1996). To date, little empirical support exists. Abraham (1998), for example, found no relation between emotional dissonance and negative affectivity.

Of course, the empirical findings of emotion work summarized in this article have to be interpreted with some care. Research on emotion work and psychological strain is still in its beginning. Emotion work measures are not yet established although recent developments seem to be promising. All results reported here are based on cross-sectional questionnaire studies which clearly limit causal interpretations of the empirical findings. It can be expected that future studies will comprise multiple data sources (Frese & Zapf, 1988; Spector, 1992).
One may, for example, either use observations to measure emotion work or one may use physiological measures for psychological strain or may use absenteeism data based on company records. Moreover, one may use longitudinal designs (Zapf, Dormann, & Frese, 1996) to assess cause–effect relations and to rule out potential alternative explanations for the emotion work–burnout relationships.

This review has shown that emotion work has both positive and negative implications. The studies currently available agree in that emotional dissonance is a stressor that is associated with emotional exhaustion and job dissatisfaction. Hence, organizations must decide whether they are willing to accept the costs of emotional dissonance or whether they wish to proactively prevent its negative effects. Although the empirical basis is still small, the data suggest that social support and control, which function as resources in the stress process, may also be important factors to consider in the design of emotion work. Control may mean to take a time out. Adelmann (1995) mentions a case where clerks in a houseware store were allowed to go ‘backstage’ to the storeroom and act their emotions out by smashing the chipped and broken stock. Hochschild (1983) reported that talking and joking about passengers had a supportive and cathartic effect. Finally, it is recommended that emotion work be explicitly considered in organizational redesign, in order to reduce or eliminate potential negative side effects. For example, Büssing and Glaser (1999b) demonstrated that in hospitals where an organizational redesign measure was successfully implemented, job stressors, such as time pressure and contradictory task goals, decreased. However, because the nurses now had more time to spend with their patients (a desired effect), emotion work increased, leading to higher levels of burnout. The expected improvements in burnout levels were not realized.

There is sufficient evidence that emotion work in organizations is an important issue and that associated negative effects on psychological well-being cannot be ignored. After this first stage of emotion work studies, more research with more sophisticated study designs is necessary to further develop this interesting field.

References


